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Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.:
State Regulation of Charitable
Fundraising Costs
I. Introduction
Public concern about misuse of funds solicited for charita-
ble' purposes has led, over the last forty years, to state legisla-
tion aimed at regulating charities. 2 Despite "substantial unanim-
ity" regarding the objective that the "greatest possible portion
of the wealth donated to private charity must be conserved and
used to further the charitable, public purpose,"3 limitations on
charitable fundraising costs remain the most controversial as-
pect of extant charitable regulation."
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court struck down a
local ordinance prohibiting solicitation by charitable organiza-
tions that did not use at least seventy-five percent of their re-
ceipts for "charitable purposes." The Court held that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally overbroad and thus violated the
first amendment rights of the charity in question.' In 1984, the
Court followed its precedent and struck down a statute that had
similar restrictions on charitable solicitation. The statute in
1. The legal definition of "charitable" includes: "every gift for a general public use,
to be applied consistent with existing laws, for benefit of an indefinite number of per-
sons, and designed to benefit them from an educational, religious, moral, physical, or
social standpoint." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (5th ed. 1979).
2. New Hampshire was the first state to enact a statute regulating charitable organi-
zations. See An Act Establishing a Register of Public Trusts, ch. 181, 1943 N.H. Laws
259 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19 (1971)). For a discussion of this
statute, see infra text accompanying notes 37-38. See also Bogert, Proposed Legislation
Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MICH. L. REV. 633, 641-42 (1954); COMMIT-
TEE ON OFFICE OF Arr'Y GEN'L, NAT'L ASS'N OF Arr'Ys GEN'L, STATE REGULATION OF CHAR-
ITABLE TRUSTS AND SOLICITATIONS 10 (1977) (hereinafter cited as NAAG].
3. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibil-
ity, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433, 434 (1960).
4. B. HOPKINS, CHARITIES UNDER SIEGE - GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF FUND RAIS-
ING 96 (1980).




question had a provision that allowed a charity to waive a
twenty-five percent limitation on the amount of proceeds that
could be used for non-charitable purposes whenever the charity
demonstrated financial necessity.6 In Secretary of State v. Jo-
seph H. Munson Co.,7 the Court held that the administrative
waiver did not remedy the constitutional defect of overbreadth.8
The narrowness of this holding belies the extent of its impact on
the future of state regulation of charitable solicitations.9
Part II of this Note explores the historical and legal back-
ground of the common law regulation of charities, its modern
statutory development, and its constitutional limitations. Part
III discusses the factual setting, the procedural history, and the
decision in Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.. Part IV
analyzes the Supreme Court's reasoning and examines the im-
pact of the decision, reviewing the alternatives available to state
regulators in the aftermath of Munson. Part V concludes that
the correct, though difficult, decision in Munson effectively pre-
cludes future state regulation of charitable solicitations through
percentage limitations on fundraising costs. Disclosure of fund-
raising costs to potential donors prior to solicitation is suggested
as the only effective and acceptable alternative to percentage
limitations.
II. Background
A. Historical Regulation of Charities
State supervision of charities dates back to Tudor Eng-
land. 10 It was then that the Chancellor, representing the Mon-
arch as parens patriae, first brought actions in the courts of
chancery to enforce charitable uses.1" Although once erroneously
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 103A-103L (1982).
7. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
8. Id. at 2850.
9. Although merely holding that the administrative waiver could not save the stat-
ute, the decision strongly indicates that the use of percentage limitations on fundraising
costs is a constitutionally defective means of regulating charitable solicitations. See infra
text accompanying notes 184, 195-238.
10. Forer, Relief of the Public Burden: The Function and Enforcement of Charities
in Pennsylvania, 27 U. PiTT. L. REV. 751, 751 (1966). See also Bogert, supra note 2, at
636.
11. NAAG, supra note 2, at 3 (citing FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERN-
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thought to have its genesis in the Statute of Charitable Uses, 12
the Chancellor's authority actually predated the statute and was
found in the common law." This common law authority de-
volved to the Attorneys General in almost all American states.1
The original rationale behind the Attorney General's power
to enforce charitable uses was the state's interest in encouraging
charitable solicitation as a means of lessening government's bur-
den of providing aid to the needy. 5 The goal of lessening this
governmental burden explains the special tax status of qualify-
ing charitable organizations. An income tax deduction is pro-
vided to individual donors as a means of encouraging dona-
tions.'" The public benefits indirectly from charitable donations
because, in their absence, greater taxation would be required.'
7
Consequently, the government has traditionally shown an inter-
MENT - STATE AND FEDERAL LAW AND SUPERVISION, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 22,
(1965)). See Comment, The Enforcement of Charitable Trusts, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 618,
625 (1966).
12. 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601). For an exploration of the history and features of English
statutes regulating charities, see Bogert, supra note 2, 636-38. This erroneous view is
exemplified by Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 1 (1819) (holding charitable trusts unenforceable under Virginia state law be-
cause English statutory law, including the Statute of Charitable Uses, had been repealed
in 1791).
13. NAAG, supra, note 2, at 3. See Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127
(1844) (holding charitable trusts enforceable in equity despite the absence of Pennsylva-
nia statutory authorization, and recognizing that the common law basis for enforcement
authority in the Attorney General preceded the Statute of Uses); Parker v. May, 59
Mass. (5 Cush.) 336 (1850) (Attorney General has common law authority to file an infor-
mation to effectuate a charitable donation); People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (1868) (Attor-
ney General retains common law power to proceed against charitable trusts).
14. See NAAG supra note 2, at 3; Comment, supra note 11, at 623; Forer, supra
note 10, at 751.
15. The original rationale of the English Parliament in enacting the Statute of Char-
itable Uses was not to protect individual donors. It was enacted at a time when caveat
emptor was the general rule and the government ordinarily did not interfere in private
transactions. See Brief for the Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 20, Secretary of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766). In contrast, most
current state and local regulations on charities assert a state interest in preventing fraud,
crime, misrepresentation, and undue annoyance. See Brief of Petitioner, at 34, Secretary
of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766). See also Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 615 (1976); Cantwell v. Conneticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
16. See I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3) (West 1984).
17. See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, 3-13 (examining the public policy ra-
tionale of tax exemptions for charitable organizations).
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est in promoting public regard for charities."8 Moreover, the
public, as the ultimate beneficiary, has had an interest in ensur-
ing that diversion and waste of funds solicited for charitable
purposes is minimized.19
From both a legal 20 and a practical 2 standpoint, however,
the public is ill-equipped to protect its interest in conserving
charitable funds. Moreover, Professor Bogert observes that
"strictly speaking the state is the only party having a legal inter-
est in enforcement, and the human beings who are favorably af-
fected by the execution of the [charitable] trust are merely the
media through whom the social advantages flow to the public. ' '2
The role of the Attorney General as the legal representative
of the state and its citizens logically 23 led to the rule that only he
could sue to enforce charitable trusts.24 But this common law
authority was rarely wielded prior to state statutory enactments
18. M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT - STATE AND FEDERAL
LAW AND SUPERVISION 28 (1965) ("indeed as a result of the enactment of the Statute [of
Charitable Uses] in 1601, the number of charities rapidly increased."). See B. HOPKINS,
supra note 4, at 18 (public regard is essential to the successful functioning of charitable
groups); see also Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (percentage limitations on fundraising costs encourage the public to
give with confidence that money designed for a charity will be spent on charitable pur-
poses); Karst, supra note 3, 482 n.192 (discussing support of registration and reporting
requirements by the banking trust industry as promoting public confidence).
19. NAAG, supra note 3, at 5.
20. Charitable beneficiaries usually belong to an indefinite class that rarely has a
right of action against a charity because most states deny standing to them. In states
where rights of statutory enforcement of charitable trusts inure to "any interested
party," courts may not hold beneficiaries to be "interested parties." NAAG, supra note
3, at 4 (citing M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 18, at 200-02). See Bogert, supra note 2, at
633-34; Winans & Rimlinger, Charitable Trusts in South Dakota: Who Shall Supervise
Their Trustees?, 21 S.D.L. REV. 232, 241 (1976). See also, Karst, supra note 3, at 449
(state policy against subjecting charity to harrassing litigation).
21. Most charitable beneficiaries are unaware of their beneficial status, and even if
they were aware that they qualify as beneficiaries, they would probably lack the funds
necessary to bring an enforcement action. Considering the costs of litigation, the likeli-
hood of alienating the trustees in whose discretion funds are normally distributed, and
the uncertainty of success, the probability of beneficiary actions seems small. See NAAG,
supra note 2 at 4. See also Karst, supra note 3, at 448.
22. Bogert, supra note 2, at 633.
23. Because the public is the ultimate beneficiary of charitable trusts, it is logical
that a public official be responsible to enforce them. NAAG, supra note 2, at 5. More-
over, the beneficiaries of charitable trusts are often incapable of taking the financial risk
involved in enforcing a charitable trust. See supra note 21.
24. Bogert, supra note 2, at 633-34.
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regulating charities . This circumstance was not the collective
fault of the Attorneys General.2' Although the common law pro-
vided them the authority to supervise charities, the Attorneys
General were largely without information of any sort regarding
the existence, no less the abuse, of charitable trusts. Indeed,
the common law provided no mechanism to collect the needed
information2" and imposed no duty on the charities to supply it.
Thus, the limited exercise of this apparently discretionary29
common law power is understandable considering the paucity of
relevant information regarding charities, the minimal, if any, po-
litical pressure on this issue, and the more immediately pressing
duties of the Attorney General's office.30 Eventually, the defi-
ciencies of this discretionary enforcement power and the conse-
quential possibility for abuse of charitable funds led to state leg-
islation that clarified and defined the authority of the Attorney
General to supervise charitable trusts.3 1
B. Modern Regulation of Charities
Thomas Jefferson once said that "the duty of every man is
to devote a certain portion of his income for charitable purposes
and .. .his further duty is to see it is applied to do the most
good."' 32 Americans have traditionally shown the desire to aid
the ill and the needy.3 Charitable contributions have been
25. See Bogert, supra note 2, at 634-35; Comment, supra note 11, at 625.
26. Bogert, supra note 2, at 634.
27. Id. at 634-35. See Karst, supra note 3, at 451; Klapp & Wertz, Supervision of
Charitable Trusts in Ohio - The Ohio Charitable Trusts Act. 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 181
(1957).
28. Although searches of probate and inheritance tax records, newspapers, and pri-
vately published directories might have provided at best an incomplete list, an effective
enforcement system clearly needs an effective information gathering mechanism to en-
sure complete and accurate data. See Karst, supra note 3, at 451-52.
29. See Karst, supra note 3, at 449-51 (discussing Ames v. Attorney General, 332
Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955), which refused to compel attorney general to bring an
action).
30. Bogert, supra note 2, at 634-35.
31. Id. at 641. See Comment, supra note 11, at 629.
32. See Note, The Regulation of Charitable Fund Raising and Spending Activities,
1975 Wis. L. REV. 1158, 1158 (1975); B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 1.
33. See, e.g., Forer, Forgotten Funds: Suggesting Disclosure Laws for Charitable
Funds, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (1957); Note, Charitable Solicitation Acts - An
Attempt to Curb Charity Cheats, 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 472, 472 (1967).
Of course, this tradition predates Thomas Jefferson. It is a part of the Judaeo-Chris-
1985]
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steadily increasing in the United States. 4 Before 1943, however,
very little statutory law ensured that charitable contributions
were applied to do the most good. 5 The public's generosity gen-
erally exceeded its caution.3 6
In 1943, New Hampshire became the first state .to enact leg-
islation that required charitable trusts to register and file annual
reports with the Attorney General.3 7 That statute provided for
public inspection of these records and authorized the Attorney
General's office to promulgate rules necessary to obtain records
and conduct investigations to effectuate the act. 8 Other states
eventually followed New Hampshire's lead, 9 and in 1954, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable
tian ethic: "When you help the poor you are lending to the Lord - and he pays won-
derful interest on your loan!" Proverbs 19:17 (The Living Bible, Paraphrased); "If thou
wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor..." Matthew 19:21
(King James); "He was a Godly man. and gave generously to charity." The Acts 10:2
(The Living Bible, Paraphrased).
34. "Since World War I charitiable solicitation has become 'big business' in the
United States." Note, supra note 32, at 1158. In 1964, charity was the fourth largest
industry in the country. Forer, supra note 10, at 755. Total contributions for all charita-
ble causes were estimated by the American Association of Fund Raising Counsel, Inc.
(AAFRC) at $6.66 billion in 1955. By 1965 that figure nearly doubled, and was estimated
at $13.29 billion. The AAFRC estimate of total giving doubled again in 1975 reaching
$29.32 billion. In 1983 the figure had swelled to $64.93 billion, 82.9 percent of which was
contributed by individuals. 11 AMERICAN Ass'N OF FUNDRAISING COUNSEL, INC., GIVING
USA, 40-41 (1984).
35. Bogert, supra note 2, at 639. It was estimated some years ago that one percent of
the billions contributed annually is diverted to fraudulent fundraisers. Note, supra note
33, at 472.
36.
This was illustrated by an incident in a New York City bank. A mother had de-
posited the contents of her son's coin bank, but had forgotten to take the
container with her when she left. Upon her return an hour later, she discovered
the coin bank standing where she had placed it, but already half filled with small
coins contributed by 'givers' who felt the urge to give, though there was not the
slightest indication of a cause.
Note, supra note 33, at 472 (citing ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 160 (1950)).
37. An Act Establishing a Register of Public Trusts, ch. 181, 1943 N.H. Laws 259
(codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19 (1971)). The act did not include
registration of charitable corporations although the draftsmen sought to include them.
The draftsmen feared that including charitable corporations would prevent the passage
of the act. See Bogert, supra note 2 at 642.
38. Bogert, supra note 2 at 642.
39. See Karst, supra note 3, at 453. After New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Ohio,




Although these statutes generally regulated only charitable
trusts,41 there was an increasing incentive to extend this regula-
tion to charitable organizations and solicitations. 42 Not only was
the amount of charitable donation on the rise,4 but also legal
commentary addressing the increased need for charitable super-
vision proliferated. 44 Moreover, political pressure, which at one
time had been lacking, mounted as a series of well publicized
abuses directed national attention to the issue. 5 This publicity
focused the nation's attention on the reasonableness of charita-
ble fundraising, public relations, and administrative costs. By
1974, twenty-five states had annual financial reporting require-
ments for soliciting charities. 4' By 1977, thirty states required
charitable organizations or their professional fundraisers to reg-
ister before conducting charitable solicitations.
47
40. Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, 7A U. L. ANN. 748
(1954). The uniform law was adopted in California, Illinois, Michigan, and Oregon.
41. California adopted the Uniform Act, but extended its scope to charitable
corporations.
42. See generally Karst, supra note 3, at 456 (advocating the extension to corporate
charities); Taylor, Accountability of Charitable Trusts 18 OHIo ST. L. J. 157, 166 (1957)
(discussing the trend toward philanthropic incorporation).
43. See supra note 34.
44. Karst, supra note 3, at 434. See also Forer, supra note 10, at 752 n.4 (provides
an extensive list of law review articles published between 1947 and 1962).
45. For a discussion of the abuses leading to the evolution of governmental regula-
tion of fundraising cost, see B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 14-17. Hopkins discusses the
following cases: State v. Kline, 266 Minn. 372, 124 N.W.2d 416 (1963) (state prosecution
for grand larceny of administrators of the Sister Kenny Foundation who, over a seven
year period, expended 16.26 million dollars of 30.67 million received on fundraising pub-
lic relations and administrative overhead); United States v. Kline, 205 F. Supp. 637 (D.
Minn. 1962) (federal prosecution for postal fraud arising from the same facts); State ex
rel. Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, No. 74-CH 5015 (Circuit Court, Cook County, 1976)
(judgment ordering payment of punitive damages where fundraisers had received
$622,000 in costs and compensation of the $785,731 that had been raised). See also Chil-
dren's Charities, 1977: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Children and Youth of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Fund
Raising By or In Behalf of Veterans: Hearings Before the House Committee on Veter-
ans Affairs, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Federal Agencies and Philanthropies: Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Governmental Operations, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Note, supra note 33, at 472-73. See generally NAAG, supra note
2, at 40-42 (providing a review of other similar state actions).
46. NAAG, supra note 2, at 28.
47. Id. Reasonable state registration requirements that do not constitute a prior re-
straint and are neither vague nor discriminatory are constitutional. See Hynes v. Mayor
19851
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In addition to the registration and reporting requirements,
the states began to regulate charitable fundraising and adminis-
trative costs directly by using percentage limitation statutes. 48
These statutes limited the amount, as a percentage of funds
solicited, that a charitable organization might directly spend on
its fundraising and administrative costs 49 or pay to a profes-
sional fundraiser or solicitor.5 0 The "simplicity and ease of ad-
ministration afforded by [percentage] limitations"'51 led twenty-
two states 52 to employ them in an effort to protect the contribut-
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
48. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 110-23; NAAG, supra note 2, at 31-34. For a
general survey of current state legislation regulating charities, see B. HOPKINS, supra
note 4, at 35-74; Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Independent Sector at la-15a, Secre-
tary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766).
49. "The National Information Bureau suggests that at least 70% of all available
contributed funds should be spent for program activities, that is, only 30% may be spent
for fund-raising." Brief of Petitioner at 35 n.23, Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766).
50. For a list of the statutes placing a percentage limitation on fundraising costs, see
infra note 52. The National Health Council, Inc. recommends that "essential" legislative
provisions should "set a limit on the amount of payment to a professional solicitor...
by any charitable organization." NATIONAL HEALTH COUNCIL, VIEWPOINTS: STATE LEGISLA-
TION REGULATING SOLICITATION OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC 8-10 (rev. ed. 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NHC, VIEWPOINTS].
51. Brief of Petitioner at 26 n.18, Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104
S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766).
52. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1610 (1980) (25% to professional fund raiser); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-179 (West 1983) (25% to 50% sliding scale); FLA. STAT. § 496.11(8)
(1984) (25% to professional fundraiser); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-7 (1984) (30% for fun-
draising and administrative costs); HAW. REV. STAT. § 467B-7(a) (1981) (20% to profes-
sional fundraiser); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23 § 5109(c) (1982) (25% for fundraising and ad-
ministrative costs); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1747(c) (1974) (25% for fundraising and
administrative costs); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 103D (1978) (25% for fundraising and
administrative costs); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 68, §§ 21-22 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984)
(50% total; 15% to professional fundraiser); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.555 (1981) (30% to
professional fundraiser); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 320.20 (1965) (15% for fundraising and
administrative costs); N.J. REV. STAT. § 45.17A-10 (1978) (15% to professional fun-
draiser); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-22-04.1 (1981) (35% total; 15% to professional fun-
draiser); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 552.3(B) (Supp. 1984) (10% to professional fun-
draiser); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.855 (1981) (25% for solicitation costs, 50% for solicitation
and administration costs); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.10, § 160-6 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (35% total;
15% to professional fundraiser); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-53-4 (Supp. 1982) (50% total; 25%
to professional fundraiser); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-80 (Law. Co-op 1977) ("reasonable
percent" to professional fundraiser); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-27-24 (1977) (re-
pealed 1984) (30% to professional fundraiser); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48 2213 (1979) (less
than 25% to professional fundraiser creates rebuttable presumption of reasonableness;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.09.100(1) (1974) (20% for solicitation costs); W. VA. CODE §
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/8
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ing public from fraud and the charities from unscrupulous, pro-
fessional fundraisers 3 Noncompliance with these statutes gen-
erally resulted in fines, or imprisonment, or state cancellation of
(or refusal to re-issue) solicitation permits. 4
Although these statutes were easy for the state to adminis-
ter and enforce, they raised many practical fairness issues. The
absence of a universal standard for computing fundraising costs,
for example, could yield dissimilar cost percentage results for
nearly identical charitable operations.55 Moreover, although an
"objective evaluation of the worthiness of voluntary agency op-
erations requires at the least consideration of . . . income per-
centage applied to purpose and program,""6 it was clear that if
comparisons of charities were to be accurate, other factors such
as the nature of the purpose and the general operation of each
charity should be considered.5 7 Beyond this basic fairness issue,
percentage limitations on charitable solicitation were challenged
as an overbroad exercise of state power to further legitimate
state interests.
C. Overbreadth Review
The fundamental legal problem presented by the regulation
of charitable solicitations concerns the scope of the statute. Ini-
tially, the inquiry concerns the definition of "charity." 58 The
29-19-7(a) (1977) (15% to professional fundraiser).
53. This protection is necessary because some charities may not scrutinize the pro-
fessional fundraiser closely enough, and may consider only the immediate economic gain
of employing one. From the charity's perspective any additional funds generated by the
professional fundraiser are "found" dollars. Even if the professional fundraiser retains
90% of the funds solicited, the 10% of the money remaining constitutes dollars not oth-
erwise available to the charity. See Brief of Petitioner at 26 n.18, Secretary of State v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766).
54. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 103L (1978).
55. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 111.
56. NHC, VIEWPOINTS, supra note 50, at 5.
57. Other factors that should be considered include: (1) the age of the agency; (2)
the choice of campaign techniques employed; (3) geographic and population differences
affecting costs; (4) acts of God; and (5) bequest giving. Id. See also Karst supra note 4,
at 467 n.143 and accompanying text (some foundations must be costly to be effective).
58. Jones, Solicitations - Charitable and Religious 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 53, 60
(1979) (recognizing that "[olne of the problems in regulating charities is determining
exactly what a charity is."). See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't.,




common law contemplated, and statutory law evolved from, the
traditional concept of a charity.59 Because statutory broadening
of this definition has caused the definition to encompass organi-
zations that, to a greater or lesser extent, advocate causes, 0 per-
centage limitations on charitable fundraising costs represent po-
tentially overbroad encroachments on first amendment rights of
speech.
The Supreme Court often invokes the overbreadth principle
in an effort to protect freedom of speech. In essence, the over-
breadth principle recognizes that "a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state reg-
ulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessa-
rily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected free-
doms.""1 There are two distinct methods that the Court employs
59. "Traditional charities" have been defined as "those which simply act as agents
to transfer funds to other charities or provide money and services to the poor." Note,
Ordinance Restricting Solicitation of Funds by Charities Restricts Freedom of
Speech - Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 9 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 185, 186 n.8 (1981). See also Citizens for a Better Env't v. Schaumburg, 590 F.2d
220, 226 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[w]here solicitors represent themselves as mere conduits for
contributions").
60. Today, statutes may define "charity" to include benevolent, philanthropic, elee-
mosynary, patriotic, humane, social service, civic, fraternal, voluntary, public interest,
cultural, artistic, environmental, social advocacy, recreational, and welfare purposes. B.
HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 76. The ordinance in Schaumburg defined a charitable organi-
zation as "[any benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, not-for-profit, or eleemosynary
group." SCHAUMBURG, ILL., VILLAGE CODE, ch. 22, art. III, § 22-19 (1975).
The Maryland Statute in Munson defines a charitable organization as "an organiza-
tion which is or holds itself out to be a benevolent, educational, philanthropic, humane,
patriotic, religious, or eleemosynary organization." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 103A(b)
(1978). These "charities" are "organizations whose primary purpose is not to provide
money or services for the poor,. . . but to gather and disseminate information about and
advocate positions on matters of public concern." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 635 (1980).
61. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). The overbreadth doctrine
orginated in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In that case, the Court recognized
a narrow exception to the general rule that a litigant only has standing to litigate his own
constitutional rights. The Court justified the exception by stating:
It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat
inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.
• . . One who might have had a licence for the asking may therefore call into
question the whole scheme of licensing when he is prosecuted for failure to pro-
cure it.. . . A like threat is inherent in a penal statute, . . . which does not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary,
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute
an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. The existence of such a statute,
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to eliminate statutory overbreadth: an "as applied" technique
and an overbreadth technique.2
The judicially restrained "as applied" approach examines a
statute in light of the challenger's activities. It truncates the
reach of overbroad legislation 'by eliminating its application to
the challenger's constitutionally protected activity.63 This ap-
proach leaves the statute in force to operate within constitu-
tional bounds.6 4
By contrast, overbreadth review is more aggressive. 5 The
challenger is permitted to argue that other conceivable statutory
applications might unconstitutionally burden protected activ-
ity."6 This technique invalidates the challenged statute on its
which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prose-
cuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, re-
suits in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.
Id. at 97-98 (citations omitted).
62. See generally Monaghan, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. REV. 844, 844-45 (1970); SHAMAN, The First Amendment Rule Against Over-
breadth, 52 TEMP. L. Q. 259, 281 (1979); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
63. This approach frames the issue as "whether what has been done has deprived
this appellant of a constitutional right. It is the law as applied that we review, not the
abstract academic questions which it might raise in some more doubtful case." Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 571 (1948) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & R. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 870 (1983) [hereinafter cited as J.
NOWAK].
64. See Monaghan, supra note 62, at 844. This approach is advantageous in limiting
the intrusion and disruption of state legislative processes and allowing the state an op-
portunity to construe the law in a constitutional manner. Id. at 849-51. See also Munson,
104 S. Ct. at 2856-57 (Stevens, J., concurring); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768
(1982). Cf. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1188 (10th ed.
1980) ("Overbreadth analysis may be especially attractive to some Justices because it
gives the appearance of leaving alternatives open to the legislature"); Shaman, supra
note 62, at 282 (with overbreadth, "abrogation of legislative goals is relatively minimal").
The "as applied" approach ensures sounder, more focused, and better informed de-
cisions by confining the analysis to the factual bases presented in a given situation. See
Monaghan, supra note 62, at 849. See also Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions,
37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1005 (1924).
65. See generally Shaman, supra note 62, at 265 (overbreadth review constitutes
judicial activism).
66. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). In doing so, the Court
often relaxes the rules of standing, ignoring the protected or unprotected status of the
complainant's conduct. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). Grant-
ing overbreadth standing is justified because the chilling effect on potential challengers
of the allegedly unconstitutional statute unacceptably delays "as applied" erosion of the
11
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face. 7 In this area, the constitutional defect of the statute goes
beyond application in a particular case; a the law is voided in
toto to avoid a "chilling" effect in protected contexts. 9
Because it is difficult to imagine a situation in which even
the most precisely worded statute does not deter speech to some
unknown extent, the Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of
substantial overbreadth in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.70 Relying on
the principle that courts do not have unlimited power to pass
judgment on the validity of state laws, 71 Broadrick relaxed over-
breadth scrutiny for statutes that go beyond regulation of pure
speech to regulate "conduct in the shadow of the First Amend-
ment. '72 In these instances, the court must believe that "the
overbreadth of the statute [is] not only real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep. '7 3 The Supreme Court first applied the overbreadth doc-
trine to charitable regulation by percentage limitation in Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.74
overbreadth through case by case adjudication. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 855.
Proponents of the "as applied" method condemn consideration of extraneous appli-
cations as the "wholly result-oriented handiwork of a Court acting 'as if it had a roving
commission' to find and cure unconstitutionality." Monaghan, supra note 62, at 846 (cit-
ing to A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 18 (1968)). See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
610-111 (1972); Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2857-58. The justification for this admittedly unre-
strained method of statutory review lies in the favored status of first amendment rights
of expression. This status derives from a recognition that they are essential to the con-
tinued existence of democracy. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1182 (1959); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). For the utilitarian justification of the
favored status of free speech, see J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
67. See Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2858 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Bogen, First
Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679, 705 (1975).
68. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 853.
69. See id. Cf. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2858 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
71. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971).
72. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 614. As the regulated activity moves from
speech toward conduct the Court also requires the overbreadth to be substantial, see
infra note 133, because the preferred status of the first amendment right applies primar-
ily to pure expression. See generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 995 (1963) (concluding that a "state may not seek to
achieve other social objectives through control of expression .... [Sluch objectives can
and must be secured through regulation of action.").
73. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 615.
74. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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D. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment,75 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
local ordinance 76 that conditioned the issuance of a charitable
solicitation permit upon satisfactory proof that at least seventy-
five percent of the proceeds of the solicitation would be used
directly for the charitable purpose of the organization. 7" The
"charitable purpose" was defined to exclude solicitation, salary,
overhead, and other administrative expenses.78 Citizens for a
Better Environment (CBE) was denied a permit because it could
not demonstrate that seventy-five percent of its receipts would
be used for the organization's charitable purpose. 9 Concluding
that the ordinance was "on its face a form of censorship," the
district court awarded summary judgments to CBE and de-
clared the code to be facially invalid in contravention of the first
and fourteenth amendments. The court of appeals8' and the Su-
preme Court82 affirmed.
The Supreme Court recognized that the village had legiti-
mate interests in protecting citizens from fraud and disruptions
of privacy, but the Court reasoned that because solicitation reg-
ulations affected first amendment interests, the regulations
"must be done 'with narrow specificity.' ",83 Although the sev-
75. 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
76. SCHAUMBURG ILL., VILLAGE CODE, ch. 22, art. III, §§ 22-1 to -24 (1975).
77. See id § 22-20(g); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
at 624. Most states, rather than specifying a minimum use of proceeds for charitable
purposes, limit the amount a charity may expend on fundraising costs. See, e.g., supra
note 52.
78. SCHAUMBURG ILL., VILLAGE CODE ch. 22, art. III, § 22-20(g) (1975).
79. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 625 (1980).
80. The Village protested the award because issues of material fact were disputed.
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 627. It had alleged that
in 1975 CBE had spent more than 60 of collected funds for employee benefits, while
CBE contended that 23.3% of its income was spent on fundraising, and 21.5%o on ad-
ministration. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, as did the district court, rea-
soning that issues of fact were not material when a facial attack called the validity of the
statute into issue. Id.
81. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 590 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.
1978).
82. Village of Schaunburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
83. Id. at 627. The Court stated that:
Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable appeals for funds, on
the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests - communication
19851
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enty-five percent limitation might be enforceable against tradi-
tional charities, 4 the Court stated that there was a class of char-
ities "to which the seventy-five percent rule could not be
constitutionally applied."8 5 These organizations, "primarily en-
gaged in research, advocacy, or public education," might neces-
sarily spend in excess of twenty-five percent of their receipts on
reasonable salaries alone, and thereby be absolutely barred from
solicitation within the village." The presumption inherent in the
ordinance was unfounded, 7 namely, that all organizations that
spend more than twenty-five percent of their receipts on fun-
draising expenses are not charitable and that allowing them to
represent themselves as such constituted fraud.8
The Court concluded that the governmental interests in
protecting the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance
are "indeed substantial" but that these interests are only pe-
ripherally promoted by the seventy-five percent limitation.8 9
Regulations that were drawn more narrowly could serve these
interests without unduly intruding on first amendment rights.90
The Court noted that simply because some methods might be
"less efficient and convenient" to administer than percentage
of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the
advocacy of causes - that are within the protection of the First Amendment.
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but
the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political
or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such infor-
mation and advocacy would likely cease.
Id. at 632. See generally Splitt, Regulation of Charitable Solicitations on Private Prop-
erty by Local Ordinance, 13 URB. LAW. 781 (1981) (discussing precise, narrow statute
drafting).
84. For a brief discussion of traditional charities, see supra note 59.
85. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 635.
86. Id. at 636.
87. This presumption was irrebuttable. But see infra text accompanying notes 92-
96.
88. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 636.
89. Id.
90. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 637. See
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("[blroad prophylactic rules in the area of
free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone ....1"). See
also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 764, 786 (1977) (state must employ
means "closely drawn to avoid abridgement [of first amendment rights]"); Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1975) (inhibitory effect of vague statute).
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limitations, a municipality was not thereby empowered to
abridge freedom of speech.91
Although the Court held that the Schaumburg ordinance
was unconstitutionally overbroad,92 it did not explicitly declare
that all percentage limitations on fundraising costs were uncon-
stitutional. In fact, the Court distinguished the Schaumburg or-
dinance from a percentage limitation enacted by the city of Fort
Worth, Texas,93 which was upheld in National Foundation v.
City of Fort Worth.94 The Fort Worth ordinance limited solicita-
tion costs to twenty percent of receipts raised but, unlike the
Schaumburg ordinance, it created a rebuttable presumption of
unreasonableness for fundraising costs exceeding the statutory
limits.9 5 Costs in excess of twenty percent of receipts were
91. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 636-39.
The regulatory methods suggested included using penal laws to punish fraudulent repre-
sentations directly, id. at 637, and promoting the disclosure of finances of charitable or-
ganizations to prevent fraud by a better informed public. Id. at 637-38.
92. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra notes 61-74 and accom-
panying text.
93. FORT WORTH, TEX., CIrY CODE ch. 32, § 32-3 (1964).
94. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
95. "Unlike the ordinance upheld in National Foundation v. Fort Worth, ... the
Village ordinance has no provision permitting an organization unable to comply with the
75% requirement to obtain a permit by demonstrating that its solicitation costs are nev-
ertheless reasonable." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at
635 n.9.
The meaning of the Court's treatment of the Fort Worth rebuttable presumption
has, however, been questioned. Most notably Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, questions
it on vagueness grounds as a potentially open-ended grant of discretion. Id. at 643 n.1
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Note, Charitable Solicitation and the First Amendment:
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), 21 URB. L. ANN.
273, 285 (1981). See also Suhrke, Schaumburg: A Supreme Court Reminder of the Basic
Values, THE PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY 6, (March 1980) (citing Adam Yarmolinsky, author
of Brief of the Amici Curiae for the Respondent Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (No. 78-1335), who argues that the Court's omission of
a rebuttable presumption in discussing alternate, less restrictive means of promoting
state interests in preventing fraud amounts to an overruling of Fort Worth sub silentio).
But see Stevenson, Key Legal Aspects of Schaumburg, THE PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY at
8, (Mar. 1980) (the "provision for waiving the fundraising cost lid is apparently a key
element in determing whether or not a statute qualifies as one of the 'less instrusive
measures available' "); Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 403 N.E.2d 191 (1980)
(ordinance that set percentage limitation costs in excess of which were presumed prima
facie unreasonable, held not violative of charity's first amendment rights because pre-
sumption could be rebutted by showing the costs were reasonable); National Black
United Fund, Inc. v. Campbell, 494 F. Supp. 748, 759-60 (D.D.C. 1980) (recognizing as




deemed unreasonable and therefore were grounds for denial of a
permit; this presumption could be rebutted if special facts or
circumstances were presented showing that higher costs were
reasonable."
Thus, the Supreme Court apparently left open the possibil-
ity that the facial overbreadth of an absolute percentage limita-
tion could be narrowed to constitutional dimensions. If a per-
centage limitation statute could be drafted precisely enough,
overbreadth review would be theoretically inappropriate, and in-
stead the "as applied" method of statutory review would be em-
ployed.9 7 Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.95 exempli-
fies the tension between these two methods of review by
focusing on whether the doctrine of substantial overbreadth
should be applied to percentage limitation statutes.
III. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
A. Facts and Procedural History
The Joseph H. Munson Co. was a professional fundraiser
whose for-profit business was promoting fundraising events and
advising customers on how best to conduct fundraising events.
Munson's Maryland customers included various chapters of the
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP).99
Article 41, section 103A of the Maryland Code regulated the
activities of charitable organizations; section 103D prohibited
charitable organizations from paying or agreeing to pay fun-
draising expenses in excess of twenty-five percent of the amount
raised. 100 The statute provided for an administrative waiver of
exceeded; but striking the statute as unconstitutionally applied).
96. National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d at 44.
97. The "as applied" overbreadth technique is discussed supra notes 63-64 and ac-
companying text.
98. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
99. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2843-44 (1984).
100. Section 103D reads in part:
(a) A charitable organization . . . may not pay or agree to pay as expenses in
connection with any fund-raising activity a total amount in excess of 25% of the
total gross income raised or received by reason of the fund-raising activity. The
Secretary of State shall, by rule or regulation . . . provide for the reporting of
actual cost, and of allocation of expenses, of a charitable organization into those
which are in connection with a fund-raising activity and those which are not. The
Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable organi-
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the twenty-five percent limitation if the limitation on expenses
"would effectively prevent the charitable organization from rais-
ing contributions." ''
Because the Munson corporation regularly charged an FOP
chapter in excess of twenty-five percent of the funds raised from
events it promoted, and because it alleged that the Secretary of
State of Maryland intended to prosecute for continued viola-
tions of section 103D, it brought an action seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Munson alleged that section 103D was an
unconstitutional infringement on its rights of free speech under
the first and fourteenth amendments.1 0 2
The circuit court upheld the statute, concluding that the
waiver provision in section 103D(a) was sufficiently flexible to
accommodate legitimate first amendment interests.'03 The court
of special appeals affirmed, 104 but a unanimous Maryland Court
zation to pay or agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activ-
ity more than 25% of its total gross income in those instances where the 25%
limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising
contributions.
The 25,% limitation in this subsection shall not apply to compensation or ex-
penses paid by a charitable organization to a professional fund-raiser counsel for
conducting feasibility studies for the purpose of determining whether or not the
charitable organization should undertake a fund-raising activity, such compensa-
tion or expenses paid for feasibility studies or preliminary planning not being con-
sidered to be expenses paid in connection with a fund-raising activity.
(b) For purposes of this section, the total gross income raised or received
shall be adjusted so as not to include contributions received equal to the actual
cost to the charitable organization of (1) goods, food, entertainment, or drink sold
or provided to the public, nor should these costs be included as fund-raising costs;
(2) the actual postage paid to the United States Postal Service and printing ex-
pense in connection with the soliciting of contributions, nor should these costs be
included as fund-raising costs.
(c) Every contract or agreement between a professional fund-raiser counsel or
a professional solicitor and a charitable organization shall be in writing, and a
copy of it shall be filed with the Secretary of State within ten days after it is
entered into and prior to any solicitations.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D (1982).
101. Id. § 103D(a).
102. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2843-44. On subsequent appeals, Munson asserted the
first amendment rights of its customer, the FOP Charity. Id., at 2847 n.6. See infra note
109 (discussing third party standing).
103. Id. at 2845.
104. Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Maryland, 48 Md. App. 273, 426 A.2d 985 (1981),
rev'd, 294 Md. 160, 448 A.2d 935 (1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
17
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:489
of Appeals reversed,10 5 concluding that Schaumburg required
that the statute be held unconstitutionally overbroad and void
on its face.1 "
B. Opinion of the Supreme Court
In a five to four decision,0 7 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals,
holding that the constitutional deficiencies in a percentage limi-
tation on fundraising expenses are not remedied by the possibil-
ity of an administrative waiver of the limitation for charities
that demonstrate the limitation would effectively prevent them
from raising contributions.0 8
1. The Majority
In analyzing the facial validity of the Maryland statute, the
Court distinguished the statute's waiver provision from the
waiver provision of the statute in National Foundation v. City
of Fort Worth, 09 which allowed a charity to rebut the presump-
105. Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Maryland, 294 Md. 160, 448 A.2d 935 (1982), aff'd,
104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
106. Id. at 173, 448 A.2d at 943.
107. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion in which Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Stevens joined. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that he would
not have granted certiorari to review a determination that Munson had standing to chal-
lenge § 103D. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and O'Connor. For a discussion of the standing issue,
see infra note 109.
108. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850.
109. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). For a discussion
of this case, see supra notes 94-96.
On the threshold issue of standing, the Court held that Munson had jus tertii stand-
ing to assert the first amendment rights of the third party, FOP. Generally, a plaintiff
"must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). A
corollary to this principle is that "constitutional rights are personal and may not be as-
serted vicariously." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). When, however,
the underlying justification - ensuring concrete adverseness necessary to promote ef-
fective advocacy - for this rule is absent, the Court will not apply it. See Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). If there is an important relationship between the litigant
and the third party, the third party is somehow limited in his ability to vindicate his own
rights, and there is little risk that granting "third party standing" to the litigant will
dilute the rights of the party not before the court, the Court will allow jus tertii standing.
See J. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 88. In granting standing to Munson, the Court reasoned
that the protected first amendment activity was at the heart of the business relationship
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tion of unreasonableness for expenses in excess of statutory lim-
its by showing that they were nevertheless reasonable. ' 0 The
Court adopted the Maryland Court of Appeals' construction of
section 103D(a),'" namely that the grounds for the statutory au-
thorization of the administrative waiver were "extremely nar-
row." ' 2 The grant of a waiver was confined to instances in which
the percentage limitation "effectively prevent[ed] the charitable
organization from raising contributions.11 3 The waiver was of
no avail to a charity that made a legitimate and reasonable pol-
icy decision to incur high costs by disseminating, discussing, and
advocating public ideas.'1 The statute, therefore, failed to dis-
tinguish between these legitimate charities and charities engag-
ing in fraud."15 Charities exercising their first amendment rights,
were barred by section 103D from pursuing their constitution-
ally protected activities."'
between Munson and FOP. Moreover, Munson's interest in challenging the statute was
completely consistent with FOP's first amendment interests. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2848.
The Court rejected Maryland's contention that jus tertii standing must be based on
a showing of substantial overbreadth. Having granted standing to Munson on third party
grounds, the Court reasoned that Munson was then free to attack the statute on over-
breadth grounds. The question of substantiality of overbreadth is more properly reserved
for the merits of the facial challenge. Id.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, argued that the Maryland courts were
free to grant standing to Munson. He reasoned that although the prudential considera-
tions regarding standing were developed for the Court's own governance, see Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936), and may be imposed on the federal courts, they are
insignificant when considering whether state courts should allow standing in a particular
case. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2855 (Stevens, J., concurring). A complete discussion of the
standing issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For a general discussion of standing, see
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984); Monaghan, Over-
breadth, 1981 S. CT. REV. 1; Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law
of Third-Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393
(1981); Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70
CALF. L. REV. 1308 (1982); Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 423 (1974).
110. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850.
111. Respondent argued that they were bound by the construction given to the stat-
ute by the Maryland Court of Appeals. Brief for the Respondent at 7, Secretary of State
v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766) (citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963)). See also Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Munson v. Secretary of State, 294 Md. at 180, 448 A.2d at 946 (1982).
113. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(a) (1982).
114. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850.
115. See id. at 2845.
116. Id. at 2850. But see id. at 2860-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claiming that
19
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Maryland contended that because the statute contained the
waiver provision it was not substantially overbroad, and it there-
fore should not be invalidated on its face. Instead Maryland
urged the Court to review the statute "as applied" to a particu-
lar charity.1 7 The Court rejected this argument stating that the
substantial overbreadth doctrine is invoked to avoid striking
down a statute on its face merely because there is some possibil-
ity that it might be applied in an unconstitutional manner.1 8
The substantial overbreadth doctrine is appropriate, when, "de-
spite some possibly impermissible application, the 'remainder of
the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct.' ""19 The Court stated
that there was no core of such conduct prohibited by the Mary-
land statute. 20
Although the possibility of a waiver might decrease the
number of impermissible applications of the statute, 2' the
Court concluded that the waiver did nothing to cure the "funda-
mentally mistaken premise" of the statute, namely that high so-
licitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud. 22 Thus, be-
cause the state chose means that were too imprecise to achieve
its objectives 123 and imposed direct, chilling restrictions on pro-
tected first amendment activities, its statute was subject to fa-
cial attack.124 Affirming the judgment of the Maryland Court of
Appeals, the Court held section 103D to be unconstitutionally
overbroad.'25
under Maryland's "more carefully drawn statute," the Schaumberg plaintiff would not
have been denied a permit to solicit funds).
117. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2851.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973)).
120. Id. at 2851.
121. Id. at 2853.
122. Id. at 2852. Charities with unpopular causes could just as easily have high fun-
draising costs as fraudulent charities could have low ones. Id. at 2853.
123. "[Tlhe statute promotes the State's interest only peripherally." Id. at 2854.
124. Id. at 2853.
125. Id. at 2854. In so doing, the Court rejected Maryland's contention that § 103D
differed from the Schaumburg ordinance in that it did not operate as a prior restraint.
Compare Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (before-the-fact regulation) with Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (after-the-fact regulation). The Court stated that the
distinction made little difference. It reasoned that the same chilling effect on protected
[Vol. 5:489
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/8
1985] MARYLAND v. MUNSON
2. The Dissent
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, focused on
whether the statute's overbreadth was substantial in relation to
its plainly legitimate sweep. 26 The dissent claimed that a sub-
stantial overbreadth analysis was appropriate in Munson be-
cause there was a "core of easily identifiable and constitutionally
proscribable" conduct that the statute prohibits.12 Section 103D
served the state's interest in protecting charities from overcharg-
ing, unscrupulous, professional fundraisers. This unscrupulous
behavior constituted that core of constitutionally proscribable
conduct. "
The dissent viewed section 103D primarily as an economic
regulation directed at professional fundraisers. It suggested that,
if economic regulation were its sole purpose, the statute would
be clearly constitutional under merely minimal standards of re-
view.12 9 The dissent, however, recognized that section 103D ap-
plied directly to fundraising expenses other than expenses paid
to the professional fundraiser. 31 As a result, it directly affected
the first amendment activities of the charities within its scope.
Consequently, to the extent that it regulated nonfraudulant
activity occurred whether caused by the lack of a solicitation permit or by the knowledge
that one's fundraising activities were illegal. Id.
The Court also rejected the state's argument that because the statute regulated
more than only door to door solicitation, as did the Schaumburg ordinance, it more thor-
oughly furthered State interests in preventing fraud. Brief for the Petitioner at 37, Sec-
retary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766). "The
statute's aim is not improved by the fact that it fires at a number of targets." Id. at 2854.
126. The initial discussion was on overbreadth standing. See supra note 109. The
overbreadth doctrine has been chacterized as "strong medicine." Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The dissent argued that to invoke it in this case at the behest
of a professional fundraiser on behalf of a charity alleging infringement of first amend-
ment rights was "bad medicine." Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2857. But cf. id. at 2856 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (stating reasons for finding third party standing as a prudential
matter).
127. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see supra text ac-
companying note 119.
128. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2859-60. That such a regulation might have an indirect and incidental
impact on speech would not be sufficient to trigger intense scrutiny. Id. Justice Stevens,
however, observed that this issue was not before the Court. The dissent's opinion on the
issue was, therefore, advisory in nature. Id. at 2855 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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charities, section 103D was overbroad.' Assuming then, that a
heightened standard of overbreadth scrutiny might apply, the
dissent reasoned that the legitimate and substantial governmen-
tal interest in preventing the excessive diversion of charitable
contributions for private gain is served by a percentage limita-
tion on fundraising costs. 132 Solicitation involves conduct, not
merely speech. The dissent stated that regulation of such con-
duct-infused speech must be substantially overbroad to be inva-
lid on its face, 33 and it concluded that Maryland's statute was
not substantially overbroad.13 4
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the majority had
ignored "crucial differences" between section 103D and the
Schaumburg ordinance.1 35 Unlike the Schaumburg ordinance,
section 103D allowed charities to exclude certain costs from
their percentage calculation for fundraising costs, making it eas-
ier to meet the twenty-five percent limit.136 According to the dis-
sent, another important exclusion accommodated the first
amendment rights of charitable organizations by exempting the
cost of printing and postage for materials used to solicit funds.1
37
Moreover, the dissent argued that the statute's waiver provision
ensured that unpopular causes would not be barred from solicit-
ing funds by the twenty-five percent limit. 38 Finally, the dissent
stated that section 103D(a) appeared to provide for a pro rata
allocation of expenses into fundraising and non-fundraising cate-
gories when an activity, such as door to door solicitation, encom-
131. See id.
132. Id. at 2859.
133. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
134. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2862 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id. Schaumburg was an eight to one decision. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined the Munson dissent because they be-
lieved that the differences in § 103D were "crucial" enough to narrow the overbreadth of
the Schaumburg absolute percentage limitation to constitutional dimensions. See id. at
2857.
136. Salaries of researchers, policy makers and technical support staff, as well as
general overhead were excluded from fundraising costs. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(a)
(1982). For the text of the statute, see supra note 100.
137. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2861. The statute also exempted the cost of goods, food,
entertainment, or drink sold at fundraising events. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(b)
(1982). For the text of the statute, see supra note 100.
138. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2861 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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passed both."3 9 Thus, "[e]xpenses associated with advocacy and
public education would be completely excluded from the fun-
draising calculus. ' 140 Thus, because the features of the Maryland
statute operated to minimize the potential overbreadth of an ab-
solute percentage limitation on fundraising expenses, the dissent
concluded that it was not substantially overbroad.'
IV. Analysis
A. Facial Review: Was it Appropriate?
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.' 42 illustrates
the maxim that "it remains a 'matter of no small difficulty' to
determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and
when 'such summary action' is inappropriate.1' 43 In a sense, the
choice is "unarbitrable," because it rests upon value judgments
concerning judicial methods of achieving the same goal: curing
overbreadth.144 Although Maryland's interests in regulating
charitable solicitations were strong and legitimate,'4 5 the Court's
difficult and controversial decision to invalidate section 103D on
its face was correct.
Professor Monaghan has suggested that consideration of
three factors should serve as a guideline for the appropriate use
139. Id..
140. Id. at 2862. The majority pointed out, however, that the regulation promul-
gated pursuant to the statute, MD. ADMIN. CODE § 01.02.04.04A(3) (1978), provided that
"the expenses of public education materials and activities, which include an appeal, spe-
cific or implied, for financial support, shall be fully allocated to fund-raising expenses."
Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850-51 n.11. The dissent replied that "possible constitutional
failings of regulations passed pursuant to a statute do not form a basis for holding the
statute itself unconstitutional." Id. at 2862 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2862.
142. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
143. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (quoting Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971)).
Professor Monaghan notes that "[o]verbreadth scrutiny does not seem sufficiently
'principled'" because "[tihe opinions have not evolved general canons for determining
when to abandon traditional methods of rehabilitating an overbroad law by carving away
invalid portions." Monaghan, supra note 62, at 846-47. With overbreadth review there is
"some risk of faulty or unreliable decisionmaking." Id. at 863. See also Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (Facial invalidation is "fundamentally at odds with the func-
tion of the federal courts in our constitutional plan.").
144. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 858.
145. See Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2849.
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of overbreadth review. 4" These guidelines, which have been sub-
stantially adopted by the Court,"1 7 are the degree of statutory
overbreadth, the area of its impact on first amendment rights,
and the availability of adjudicatory alternatives to overbreadth
review.148 Professor Monaghan states that if, upon consideration
of these factors, the chilling effect of a statute is taken seriously,
"as applied" review is inadequate. 4 9 Although an evaluation of
the first guideline, the degree of overbreadth, lends little aid to
an understanding of the Munson decision, consideration of the
area of the impact and the alternatives to overbreadth review is
helpful.
1. Degree of Overbreadth
The Supreme Court employs overbreadth review in cases in
which it determines that there is a strong possibility that a stat-
ute's very existence will inhibit free speech. Broadrick v.
Oklahoma'5" is often cited for the proposition that to invalidate
a facially overbroad statute that affects conduct, and not merely
speech, the degree of overbreadth must be substantial in relation
to its plainly legitimate sweep. But, in order to be reviewed
under the substantial overbreadth test, statutes regulating con-
duct in the "shadow" of the first amendment must do so in a
neutral and noncensorial manner. Thus under Broadrick, if the
statute effects conduct as well as speech, and is neutral and not
censorial, facial invalidation is appropriate only if the statute's
overbreadth is substantial in relation to its constitutional appli-
cation.1 51 To determine whether the fraudulent solicitation that
section 103D seeks to regulate is conduct or speech, Broadrick
presumably gives the Court the difficult task of locating fraudu-
lent solicitation on the speech-conduct continuum before it can
assess how substantial the statute's overbreadth must be in or-
146. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 858-63.
147. Professor Monaghan has influenced the Supreme Court's overbreadth thinking.
In fact, his observations were incorporated into Broadrick v. Oklahoma. See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 n.12 (1973). His influence was evident in Munson as well.
See Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2848 (citing Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. CT. REV. 1).
148. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 858.
149. Id. at 858.
150. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).




der to trigger facial invalidity. 15 2 Because this determination is
difficult and subjective, it offers little guidance to both courts
and legislators. 153
Assuming that section 103D regulates conduct in a non-neu-
tral, censorial manner,"" a court must still determine what is
meant by "substantial overbreadth." By definition, overbreadth
review requires the court to envision potential encroachments on
imaginary protected speech 5 5 in a "speculative and amorphous"
process. 56 Moreover, the Court has not defined what it means
by "substantial overbreadth" with a great degree of specific-
ity. 1 57 Therefore, although its "flexible" features' 5 make section
152. See id. at 615.
153. It has been suggested that the "constitutional distinction between speech and
conduct is specious." Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80
(1968) (Speech is conduct, and actions speak.).
154. Arguably, percentage limitations on fundraising expenses need not be subject
to scrutiny under the substantial overbreadth rule because they do not regulate in a
neutral manner. Percentage limitations affect charities of unpopular causes to a greater
extent than charities with popular causes. In addition, percentage limitations would be
non-neutral with respect to charities with different ages, geographic locations, and cam-
paign techniques. See NHC, VIEwPoINrs supra note 50, at 5. See generally B. HOPKINS,
supra note 4, at 110-23 (discussing various aspects of the fundraising cost percentage
approach).
155. See Shaman, supra note 62, at 265-67. "Musings as to possible applications of a
statute to third parties in hypothetical situations may be fitting for the classroom and
the statehouse, but they are neither wise nor permissible in the courtroom." Munson,
104 S. Ct. at 2858 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. G. Gunther, supra note 64, at 1190 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)). See also Shaman, supra note 62, at 270 (maintaining that the "criterion of 'sub-
stantiality' is extremely amorphous and, therefore, prone to produce inconsistent
result.").
157. Recently the Supreme Court elaborated on Broadrick's substantial overbreadth
technique. Reviewing the overbreadth doctrine in Members of the City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984), the Court concluded that it would be inappro-
priate to entertain a facial overbreadth challenge to an ordinance when there is nothing
to indicate that the challenged ordinance will have any different impact on the protected
interests of individuals not before the court. Id. at 2127. Specifically, the Court
commented:
The concept of "substantial overbreadth" is not readily reduced to an exact
definition. It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one can conceive of some
impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to
an overbreadth challenge. On the contrary, the requirement of substantial over-
breadth stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception it-
self-the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of
third parties who are not before the Court. . . . In short, there must be a realistic
danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially chal-
1985]
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103D less overbroad than the absolute percentage limitation on
fundraising expenses in Schaumburg, the speculative nature of
overbreadth review and the paucity of case law concerning per-
centage limitations,1 59 make it difficult to understand or justify
the Munson decision in terms of the degree of overbreadth.6 0
2. Area of Impact
The nature of the activity that a statute restricts also helps
to determine whether overbreadth review is appropriate.
1 6 1 If
the statute in question regulates activity outside the realm of
the first amendment and it has only an incidental, indirect effect
on protected speech, then "as applied" review is appropriate,
unless the statute is substantially overbroad.16 2 Strict over-
breadth review with little or no attention to the degree of over-
breadth is applicable if the statute, by its terms or in its effect,
directly burdens protected activity.16 3 Here the Supreme Court
lenged on overbreadth grounds.
Id. at 2126 (footnote omitted).
Although Munson offered the Court a chance to apply the Vincent standard, the
Court did not expressly rely on that standard. See Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2852-53. Thus,
the importance of Vincent is unclear. Justice Brennan's objection that the concept of
substantial overbreadth is "obscure" is still true today. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. For a description of the fundraising cost exclusions, allocations, and waiver that
make the statute "flexible," see supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. Referring to
§ 103D, the National Association of Attorneys General states: "there appears to be a
trend toward allowing more flexibility in the amount spent for fund-raising." NAAG,
supra note 2, at 31.
159. Aside from Munson, Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620
(1979), is the only case in which the Court has spoken directly about the constitutional-
ity of percentage limitations on fundraising expenses vis-a-vis free speech. In Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S 228, 246-47 (1982), the Court struck down, on establishment clause
grounds, a Minnesota statute that imposed reporting and registration requirements only
on religious organizations soliciting more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers.
160. As one commentator has observed: "In several instances, the overbreadth rule
has served to allow the Court to sidestep difficult or sensitive issues." Shaman, supra
note 62, at 266.
161. See Monaghan, supra note 62, at 860.
162. See id. at 860-61. Professor Monaghan asserts that "[l]awmaking machinery
not aimed at first amendment activities may not normally be animated by the need to
focus with the precision uniquely necessary in this area. The task of reshaping [these]
overbroad statutes . . . may properly fall to the courts in these circumstances." Id.
163. See id. at 861. Of course, not all expressive activity is protected. "The First
Amendment is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness." A. MEIKL.JOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
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has offered more guidance. It has established that charitable so-
licitations implicate speech interests protected by the first
amendment.""
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment,'65 for instance, the Court held that percentage limitations
on fundraising expenses were direct and substantial limitations
on protected activity."'6 The Court invoked overbreadth review,
voiding the statute on its face without mentioning the Broadrick
requirement of substantial overbreadth in the decision on the
merits." 7 In Munson, section 103D, like the ordinance in
Schaumburg, was directed at limiting the fundraising expenses
of charitable organizations. 6 8 Thus, the direct nature of the
statute's impact on protected expression rendered it vulnerable
to overbreadth scrutiny and provides a stronger basis for the re-
sult in Munson, than the degree of overbreadth analysis does. A
percentage limitation on fundraising directly and unnecessarily
restricts protected first amendment activity.'
3. Adjudicatory Alternatives
The unavailability of "adjudicatory alternatives" to facial
scrutiny of percentage limitation statutes is a third factor used
164. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
For the line of cases in which the Court has developed this proposition, see Hynes v.
Mayor Oradell, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
165. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
166. Id. at 636.
167. See id. 636-39. Passing reference was, however, made to substantial over-
breadth with respect to the standing issue. See id. at 634.
168. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 103D (1982).
169. The dissent, seeking to invoke the substantial overbreadth doctrine, argues un-
persuasively that § 103D was directed primarily at "controlling external economic rela-
tions between charities and professional fundraisers." Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Although the professional fundraiser was required by § 103F to
register and comply with the whole subtitle, including the § 103D percentage restrictions
on charitable organizations, see supra note 106, the language of the statute fails to evince
this primary purpose. The preamble to the 1976 statute states that the legislation was a
result of news articles regarding the Pallotine scandal in which $5.6 million of the $7.6
million raised was expended on a direct mail campaign. See Brief of Petitioner at 11 n.8,
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766). The
preamble makes no mention of the professional fundraiser.
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by the Court to determine the method of statutory review, 70
and it provides a clear framework through which the Munson
decision may be understood. If unconstitutional applications of
the statute cannot be excised, for example, by placing a limiting
construction on the statute, then overbreadth review is appro-
priate.1 71 The possibility of a successful limiting construction de-
pends on successfully defining the factual situations in which the
statute is constitutionally applicable.1 72 For this reason, the
Court has held that the easy identification of a core of constitu-
tionally proscribable conduct that is prohibited by the statute is
a pre-requisite for a statute to avoid facial review. 7
The definition of a "charity" is very broad. 174 Charitable or-
ganizations vary in many respects. These variables include the
nature and age of the organization, the popularity of its cause,
and its method of solicitation. 75 At one end of the spectrum,
there are traditional charities "that represent themselves as
mere conduits for contributions.1' 76 The Supreme Court has
stated that percentage limitations "might be [constitutionally]
enforceable, 1' 77 if applied to charities acting as conduits. At the
other extreme, there are charities that are organized solely to
advocate causes of a political, religious, social, or humanitarian
nature. Absolute percentage limitations cannot be constitution-
ally applied to these charities. 78 In reality, however, most chari-
ties exist in between these extreme variables. In each instance,
solicitation is characteristically intertwined to some extent with
informative and advocatory speech.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
171. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) ("Facial overbreadth has not
been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute."). See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 774-75 (1977); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
754-55 (1974); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965).
172. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 862-63.
173. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 n.25 (1982); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 760 (1973); United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973).
174. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
175. Other variables include the effectiveness of management, the choice of cam-
paign techniques, and the amount of bequests received. For an extensive list of variables,
see NHC, VIEWPOINTS, supra note 50 at 5.
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To determine the class to which percentage limitations can
be constitutionally applied, jurists would have to balance each of
the many variables against the proffered state interests in regu-
lating charitable solicitations.I 9 Identifying the permissible class
would be an enormously complex and subjective undertaking.
The burden of that task makes successful attempts to judicially
truncate'8 0 percentage limitation statutes to constitutional
dimensions unlikely. 81 Section 103D was properly subject to fa-
cial review because the extremely diverse nature of charities fall-
ing within the statute makes the identification of a core of con-
stitutionally proscribable conduct nearly impossible. 182
B. Impact of the Decision
The meaning of Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson
Co. 8 3 may be that percentage limitations imposed directly on
charitable fundraising costs are no longer an acceptable means
of regulating charitable solicitations. Although it is not abso-
lutely clear, the decision seems to indicate that available alter-
natives to percentage limitations preclude the possibility that
percentage limitation statutes can be legislatively narrowed to
meet constitutional dimensions. 84
179. See Monaghan, supra note 62, at 862-63.
180. By modifying the statutory definition of a charity, legislators can also attempt
to limit the permissible scope of the regulation. Religious and educational organizations
are often exempt. Charities soliciting donations from their own members also enjoy a
relaxed status. Section 103D exempts charitable salvage organizations. See B. HOPKINS,
supra note 4, at 227-30.
181. In Munson, the Court recognized that limiting constructions on percentage lim-
itations were unlikely. "[Tihough the dissenters are loathe to admit it, the State's high-
est court has had an opportunity to construe the statute to avoid constitutional infirmi-
ties and has been unable to do so." Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2852 n.13.
182. See id. at 2852.
183. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
184. The Court considered that high solicitation costs are an accurate measure of
fraud is a "fundamentally mistaken premise." Id. at 2852. Percentage limitations are too
imprecise to achieve state interests. Id. at 2852 n.14. Despite this strong language, how-
ever, the Court seems to be reluctant to pronounce percentage limitations unconstitu-
tional per se. Although the Brief of the Petitioner frames the issue in terms of per se
constitutionality, the Court avoided this language. Compare Brief of the Petitioner at i,
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766), with
Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850. Moreover the Court seems reluctant to explicitly overrule
National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1040 (1970), which implies that percentage limitations with "reasonableness" waiv-
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Overbreadth scrutiny is not concerned with the "substan-
tive dimensions of protected speech"' 8 5 but with the means that
the legislature employs to pursue admittedly substantial govern-
mental interests. 186 The statutory means to achieve these gov-
ernmental ends must be narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary
interference with first amendment freedoms. 187 In Schaumburg,
an absolute percentage limitation on fundraising costs was
deemed to be a means insufficiently related to achieving govern-
mental interests to justify interference with these freedoms.'88
Although some of the features of section 103D reduced its inter-
ers might pass constitutional muster despite their inherent vagueness. But see supra
note 95.
The possibility of drafting narrower percentage limitation statutes is perhaps ren-
dered moot by indications that state regulators have largely read the Munson decision to
preclude direct regulation of charities by use of percentage limitations. Telephone inter-
view with C. Rosso, Illinois Attorney General's Office (September 26, 1984) (discussing a
joint meeting of the Charitable Trusts and Solicitations Committee of the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General with National Association of State Charities Officials in
Boston, Mass. September 20-21, 1984). Letter from R. Zarnoch, Ass't Attorney General
of Maryland, to the Author (Nov. 29, 1984) (copy available at the Pace Law Review) ("In
our view, (after Munson] there is nothing a State can do to salvage a percentage limita-
tion on charitable fund raising).
The lack of absolute clarity on this point, the closeness of the five to four decision,
and the likelihood of imminent changes in the Court's composition, do not totally rule
out the possibility that a more precisely drafted statute might survive overbreadth re-
view. Illinois, for example, claims that its statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 5101-5114
(1982), is different because it provides for a deduction of reasonable and necessary ex-
penses before application of the percentage limitation. Telephne interview with C.
Rosso, supra.
185. G. Gunther, supra note 64, at 134. The opinions avoid explicity balancing in-
terests. Id. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
186. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980). These interests have also been described as subordinating and compelling, Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); legitimate, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
615 (1973); and strong and subordinating, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
187. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 637. See
also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(maintaining that regulation "must be in proportion to that interest" and designed care-
fully); First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (maintaining that regulation
"must be closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement"); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,
425 U.S. 610, 620 (1975) (holding that the "government may regulate .. only with nar-
row specificity"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (holding that the "preci-
sion of regulation must be the touchstone.").
188. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 639. See also
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 438 (recognizing that "broad prophylactic rules in the
area of free expression are suspect.").
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ference with protected first amendment interests, 189 the availa-
bility of less drastic means to ensure that contributions will be
used to benefit their intended purpose obviated consideration of
whether this reduced interference could save the statute. °90
The Supreme Court's decisions have not always indicated
what "less drastic means" may be used to further state inter-
ests.91 Nevertheless, the Court has suggested that direct prohi-
bition of fraud 192 and disclosure of fundraising costs,9 3 are via-
ble alternatives to regulation by percentage limitations on
charitable fundraising costs." A reading of the Munson decision
indicates that two distinct issues foreshadow the arena in which
state legislators will seek to regulate charitable solicitations after
Munson. The resolution of these issues will define the limits of
the State's ability both to affect charitable solicitations by regu-
lating the professional fundraiser, and to impose fundraising
cost disclosure requirements upon charitable organizations.
1. Regulation of the Professional Fundraiser
The Munson decision clearly presages the first issue,
namely, whether statutes regulating only the percentage rates
charged by professional fundraisers for services rendered to
189. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
190. Because the majority did not use substantial overbreadth as the basis for in-
voking facial review, it declined to consider "decreasefs] in the number of impermissible
applications of the statute." Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2853. The dissent, on the other hand,
considered that reduced interference with protected first amendment interests was a sig-
nificant factor "tending to decrease overbreadth in relation to the statute's legitimate
sweep." Id. at 2861 n. 3. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191. G. Gunther, supra note 64, at 1187 n.7. See Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L. J. 464, 471 (1969).
192. Many states directly regulate fraud. Such regulations are unsatisfactory in that
they are not effective and convenient methods of preventing fraud. They "relegate" gov-
ernments interested in regulating charitable solicitations "to the role of Sisyphus." Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 639 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
193. See infra notes 208-38 and accompanying text.
194. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 637-38;
See also Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850 n.9; Henchey, The Constitutional Implications of
Regulation of Charities and Fundraisers, NAT'L Ass'N. ATT'Y GEN., CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION REPORT, 1, 6-7 (Aug. 1984) (copy available at the Pace Law Review). The reasoning
and conclusions contained therein are Ms. Henchey's, and do not constitute the official
positions of the National Association of Attorneys General.
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charitable organizations would be constitutional. 1 5 Is the speech
of a paid professional fundraiser sufficiently removed and dis-
tinct from the direct and protected speech of the charities which
employ them, so that such regulations would be judged by "the
minimum rationality standard traditionally applied to economic
regulations"?196
Many states have directly regulated professional fundraisers
for some time, 97 and other states are turning to direct regula-
tion as a result of the Munson decision.1 98 Although "the right to
make a profit is not protected by the First Amendment,"19 9 it is
not clear whether the Court will review the speech of profes-
sional fundraisers under the minimum rationality standards
used in economic regulation cases. If the Court does not, the ra-
tionale of Schaumburg and Munson will apply and will trigger
facial review.200
195. Compare Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding
that statutes regulating only the rates professional fundraisers charge charities would be
"clearly constitutional" under minimum rationality standards traditionally applied to ec-
onomic regulations) with id., 104 S. Ct. at 2855 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
the dissent's conclusion was advisory because the issue was not before the court).
196. Id. at 2859. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S 479, 488 (1960).
197. See Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, at la-15a, Secretary of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2839 (1984) (No. 82-766). See supra note
52.
198. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 103F-2(0)(1) (1984) (limiting amount profes-
sional solicitor can charge charities to 30 percent of the total rai~ed). Maryland's attor-
ney general's office contends that this legislation will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Letter from R. Zarnoch, supra note 184.
199. Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 70, 403 N.E.2d 191, 195 (1980).
200. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1976), the Court refused to
apply overbreadth scrutiny to regulations on lawyer advertising. The Court stated that
the justification facial review "applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial con-
text" because commercial speech is less likely to be susceptible to the chilling effects of
overbroad legislation. Id. at 380-81. See also California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (suggesting that "speech by proxy" is not entitled to
full first amendment protection, as long as direct limitations on speech are not imposed);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462-67 (1978) (invoking "as applied" re-
view and holding that if pecunicary gain motivated lawyer solicitation of clients, a state
could constitutionally promote its interests in protecting the public from fraud with dis-
ciplinary action); Grant v. Meyer, 741 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 1984) (one may not
claim an invasion of speech because someone else cannot be paid to speak).
Nevertheless, one commentator maintains that restrictions on professional fun-
draisers implicate charities' first amendment rights. See Henchey, supra note 194, at 3.
Cf. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2853 n.16. "The fact that paid solicitors are used to dissemi-
nate information did not alter the Schaumburg Court's conclusion that a limitation on
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Assuming arguendo, that speech by professional fundraisers
is deemed commercial in the future, a four-part analysis devel-
oped in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commissioner2"' would apply. First, the regulated speech must
be protected by the first amendment. For commercial speech to
come within the first amendment, it must be lawful and not mis-
leading. 202 A professional fundraiser's speech is plainly lawful.
Moreover, the Munson Court rejected the contention that it was
fraudulent, even if costly.2 03
Second, Central Hudson requires that the asserted govern-
mental interest for the regulation must be substantial °.20  Pro-
tecting the public from fraud is clearly a substantial governmen-
tal interest.20 5 Finally, because, in the hypothetical, both
determinations "yield positive answers," Central Hudson then
requires that, to avoid unconstitutionality, governmental regula-
tion of commercial speech must directly advance the asserted
governmental interest, and not be more extensive than neces-
sary.206 Munson and Schaumburg supply definite answers to
these criteria.20 7 Percentage limitations on fundraising costs do
not directly advance state interests and are more extensive than
necessary. Thus, even by the relaxed standard of review applied
to commercial speech the direct regulation of professional fun-
draisers would seem constitutionally deficient. One effect of the
Munson decision will be to foment future litigation regarding
this issue, and resolution of the issue will define the limits of
the amount a charity can spend in fundraising activity is a direct restriction on the char-
ity's First Amendment rights. Id.
Two state supreme courts have considered the constitutionality of direct percentage
limitations on professional fundraisers, and each has decided differently. Compare Hol-
loway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St.2d 65, 403 N.E.2d 191 (1980) (upholding a regulation that
prohibited professional fundraisers from retaining in excess of 75% of gross receipts,
unless shown to be reasonable) with State ex rel. Olson v. W.R.G. Enterprises, Inc., 314
N.W.2d 842 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a limitation of 15 percent of funds raised
which a charity could pay a professional fundraiser).
201. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
202. Id. at 566.
203. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2852. See Henchey, supra note 194, at 3.
204. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 566.
205. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 447 U.S. at 636.
206. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 566.
207. See Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2853; Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. at 639.
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state power to regulate professional fundraisers.
2. Disclosure of Fundraising Costs
The Court has twice suggested that a state can require dis-
closure of financial data by charitable organizations."" The state
interest asserted to justify percentage limitations on fundraising
costs is the prevention of fraud and misrepresentation. 0 9 Mun-
son, however, deemed percentage limitations too imprecise and
too peripheral to prevent fraud.2"' If fraud is a "false representa-
tion of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct. . . or
by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,' 21 1
the most obvious and direct way to prevent fraud is to promote
disclosure of fundraising costs. 21 2
Disclosure of fundraising costs is attractive because it allows
the recipient to protect his personal interests in giving, without
deterring the free speech of the discloser.213 Although consumer-
ism has generally fostered an emphasis on disclosure,2"4 requir-
208. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2850 n.9 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637-38 (1979)). The idea is not new or unique to charitable
solicitations. Federal legislation to promote disclosure has been introduced into Congress
on several occasions. The "Wilson bill" would have increased the authority of the U.S.
Postal Service to monitor fundraising by mail, requiring literature to contain specified
information including percentage fundraising costs. H.R. 9584, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 119
CONG. REC. 25,879 (1973). The "Mondale bill" grafted disclosure statement provisions
onto the Internal Revenue Code, requiring charitable organizations to divulge informa-
tion for the prior year concerning revenues, and expenditures for charitable and non-
charitable purposes. The bill also required that charities within its scope distribute at
least 50% of their gross revenues each year for charitable purposes. Truth in Contribu-
tions Act, S. 1153, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also H.R. 11991, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). All of these bills failed to pass. Lack of support among the philanthropic commu-
nity contributed to their demise. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 218-20.
209. "There is an element of fraud in soliciting money 'for' a charity when in reality
that charity will see only a small fraction of the funds collected." Munson, 104 S. Ct. at
2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2849; Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 637-38.
210. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2849.
211. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
212. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 637-38.
213. Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (1963)
("The only sense in which this ... 'deters' free speech is that it may render fruitless
efforts to persuade ....1").
214. See, e.g., The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982) (requires full dis-
closure of material information concerning public offerings of corporate securities to pro-
tect investors against fraud); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-43 (1982) (promot-
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ing disclosure of charitable solicitors raises serious practical and
constitutional problems.21 I A central problem involves the means
chosen by the state to effectuate the disclosure of fundraising
costs.2 1 There are two principal modes of disclosure: demand
disclosure and point-of-solicitation disclosure. 7
Demand disclosure requires charitable organizations to di-
vulge financial data to the public only upon request.218 Demand
disclosure does not provide the public with the information nec-
essary to illuminate a decision to donate to that particular char-
ity.2'19 Most solicitations invite immediate contribution, but de-
mand disclosure involves after-the-fact disclosure and therefore
does not promote informed giving. Moreover, it places the bur-
den and cost of seeking a refund upon a discontented giver.220
Point-of-solicitation disclosure requires a charity to divulge
the fraction of funds it applies toward charitable purposes
before the request for money is made. 22 ' Although it is a highly
effective means of providing information, its detractors claim
that point-of-solicitation disclosure of fundraising costs is mis-
leading, counter-productive, and impermissibly burdens first
amendment expression.222
ing meaningful and accurate disclosure of credit terms, reflecting "a transition in
Congressional policy from a philosophy of let-the-buyer-beware to one of let-the-seller-
disclose"); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601-17 (1982) (insuring
that consumers nationwide receive greater and more timely information regarding the
nature and costs of the settlement process). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (N.D. Ind. 1975),
af'd, 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976); B. HOPKINS, supra note 4,
at 221.
215. See generally Ballew, The New California Charitable Solicitation Disclosure
Law: Application and Needed Amendments, 12 PAC. L.J. 871 (1981) (exploring the diffi-
culties inherent in disclosure requirements).
216. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.
217. Id. A third approach has been taken by North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
131C-16 (1981) ("disclosure shall be published in the newspaper having the largest au-
dited circulation in each county for three consecutive days each year").
218. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.
219. See KURTZ, CONCEPTS FOR NAAG CHARITABLE SOLICITATION LAW PROJECT 9
(1984). In the year ending March 31, 1984 the Secretary of State of New York received
13,000 requests for financial reports; only 1.4 for each of the 9,400 registered charitable
organizations in the state. Id.
220. Id.
221. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.
222. Id. at 109-10.
Modified point-of-solicitation disclosure is also a possiblity. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT.
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Conceivably it is misleading to evaluate the objective worth
of a charitable cause by considering a single percentage figure
for fundraising costs at the point of solicitation.223 Because a
myriad of factors determine the reasonableness of costs, contrib-
utors will ostensibly be incapable of making meaningful deci-
sions based on such meager information. 24 People will respond
merely to a number, favoring charities with low percentage costs
and spurning charities with high percentages. That there may be
advantages to ignorance, however, was the kind of argument
soundly rejected as highly paternalistic by the Supreme Court in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.225 The unacceptable presumption of con-
tributor short-sightedness, together with the spirit of the first
amendment,226 undermine the contention that contributors will
be incapable of making meaningful decisions.
Charities claim that disclosure at the point of solicitation
increases their relative costs 227 and is therefore counter-produc-
tive to the primary goal of donating the maximum portion of
raised funds to charitable purposes. 22 Requiring disclosure may
make solicitations confusing, less appealing, and more costly to
ANN. tit. 9, § 50 (1978) (requiring disclosure of percent fundraising costs if less than 70%
of funds raised are expended for program services). See generally B. HOPKINS, supra
note 4, at 223 (ultimate method of disclosure chosen will be a compromise between the
two modes); Stevenson, Regulation in the 80's: A New Approach, THE PHILANTHROPY
MONTHLY 34 (1980) (Suggests that once a charity exceeds 50% of the total fundraising,
disclosure at point of solicitation should be made in a nonspecific way. "Less than fifty
cents of every dollar given is used for charitable purposes.").
223. The weakness inherent in employing percentage costs as an indicator of a char-
ity's worth is the same whether it is the basis for a governmental decision to deny a
permit or a private decision to refuse to contribute. See supra notes 55-57 and accompa-
nying text.
224. "[F]irst amendment objectives are furthered if the bearer is able to make an
informed, even if biased, choice." Note, supra note 213, at 1275.
225. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court stated that "[ult is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of supressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is
freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us." Id. at 770.
226. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 163, at 26 (The first amendment functions pri-
marily to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.).
227. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109. Increased direct costs include printing
and mailing costs of disclosure notices, increased time to disclose during solicitation, and
increased media time. Increased indirect costs result from the reduced effectiveness of
solicitation anticipated to flow from disclosure requirements; the result is fewer dollars
per solicitation.
228. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
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undertake.2 29 Professor Karst suggests that governmental ab-
sorbtion or strict control of charities would result in reduced
costs and that the very institution of private philanthropy is
wasteful.2 30 Governmental absorption of charities, however, is
unacceptable because "there are values in private charity which
justify some immediate economic waste."'2 31 Those values are
philanthropic experimentation and risk-taking.23 2 The cost of
these values, borne by society at large, is a price society is will-
ing to pay for private philanthropy.2 33 The value of informed
decisionmaking justifies any "immediate economic waste"
caused by point-of-solicitation disclosure.
Although disclosure may not in an orthodox sense deter
speech,234 in some contexts disclosure represents a content-regu-
lating burden on expression. 235 The Supreme Court has been
largely silent concerning the burdens of point-of-solicitation dis-
closures on free speech. 236 The California Supreme Court, how-
229. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.




233. The burden of decisionmaking is shifted from governmentally exercised control
through chilling percentage limitations on who may solicit, to private contributor deci-
sions regarding who will receive their funds of all those permitted to solicit.
234. See supra note 213.
235. See Memphis Pub. Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn 1982) (holding
unconstitutional a state imposed requirement on newspaper advertisements for alcoholic
beverages of disclosing the illegality and possible consequences of transporting such bev-
erages into the state without a permit). Cf. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) (unanimously holding unconstitutional a state statute granting political can-
didates a right to reply to newspaper criticisms). But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (unanimously upholding F.C.C. regulations requiring radio and
television reply time to the public in cases involving personal attacks or political
editorials).
236. Although regulators have been encouraged by the Schaumburg and Munson
Courts' suggestion that disclosure is an acceptable alternative to percentage limitations
on fundraising costs, the decisions shed little light upon the acceptability of point-of-
solicitation disclosure requirements. The disclosure sanctioned in each case was that of
financial data to the State Attorney General's office. Munson, 104 U.S. at 2850 n.9, Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 638 n.12. States have been
regulating charities in this manner for over 40 years. See supra text accompanying notes
37-53.
In International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541
(5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit rejected first amendment attacks on a city ordinance
requiring solicitors to wear approved identification badges while soliciting, and filing re-
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ever, addressed this issue in 1945 in Gospel Army v. City of Los
Angeles.237 The city had passed a municipal code requiring solic-
itors to exhibit an information card to all prospective donors.
This card contained disclosure of percentage fundraising costs.
Writing for the court, a forward-looking Justice Traynor stated
that these provisions:
are designed primarily to secure information that will assist the
public in judging the nature and worthiness of the cause for
which the solicitation is made and to insure the presentation of
such information to prospective donors. We find nothing unduly
burdensome or unreasonable in any of these provisions. 2s 8
Disclosure of fundraising costs at the point of solicitation
directly serves state interests in preventing fraud by fostering
informed giving, without preventing the advocacy of ideas. Al-
though objections to disclosure have some merit, they seem in-
sufficiently weighty to vitiate the state's interests in imposing
some means of disclosure when the donation is requested.
Whether point-of-solicitation disclosure represents an impermis-
sible burden on speech is an issue likely to reach the Supreme
Court if state legislators read the Munson decision as impliedly
sanctioning these regulations as a less drastic means to serve
state interests.
V. Conclusion
State regulation of charitable solicitations has long been
considered essential to promote the substantial governmental in-
terests of protecting the public from fraudulent diversion of
charitable funds. State efforts to promote these traditional inter-
ests by regulating charities have conflicted with important first
amendment rights. Resolving the tension between these conflict-
ing interests was the difficult task of the Munson Court. Secre-
tary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co. 23 '9 holds that percentage
limitations on fundraising costs are overbroad, because percent-
gistration statements disclosing costs and amounts of contributions to the state. This
information was then available for public inspection.
237. 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945), appeal dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, 331 U.S. 543 (1947).
238. Id.




age limitations cannot accurately isolate a fraudulent class of
charities and because such limits chill protected expression,
while only peripherally promoting state interests.
State attempts at similar regulations directed solely toward
professional fundraisers, under the guise of economic regula-
tions, seem equally unsatisfactory. But regulations that require
disclosure of charitable fundraising costs directly promote state
interests and minimally chill protected expression. To effectively
further the goal of informed decisionmaking, some form of dis-
closure should be given when the solicitation is made. Although
point-of-solicitation disclosure has been criticized as misleading,
costly, and burdensome, an analysis of these contentions indi-
cates that the benefits to the giving public outweigh the disad-
vantages of disclosure. In the words of Justice Brandeis: "Pub-
licity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman."2 "
Jeffrey T. Zachmann
240. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
19851
39
